Why V.League clubs in 2026-2026 are all returning to the three-centre-back system? The truth behind the tactical craze

On a hot September afternoon at Hang Day Stadium, I sat in the stands taking notes when the home team, Cong An Ha Noi, left the pitch after facing Steel Xanh Nam Dinh. They didn't win. But what caught my attention was not the 1-2 scoreline. After more than 20 matches following the V.League this season, I began to notice that too many teams were lining up with three centre-backs in midfield. It's not a new tactic. It's a return. In just three years, the percentage of V.League clubs choosing 3-4-3 or 3-5-2 lineups in their starting eleven has increased from 12% to over 45% in the 2026-2026 season. The question is whether this is a tactical step forward or a way for coaches to protect their reputations. Last season, Ha Noi FC under coach Le Duc Tuan once won 3-0 against Quy Nhon Binh Dinh with a four-man defence. But immediately in the next match, when facing Ho Chi Minh City FC, the team switched to three centre-backs and played like an entirely different team. They conceded only one goal in the next five matches. This change is so common that formations this season no longer surprise anyone. But there is a subtle detail that surface statistics miss: when switching to three centre-backs, V.League teams do not defend better. They just defend more safely. On average, teams playing 3-4-3 concede 0.4 goals more per match than teams playing 4-3-3 in the same period. But their defeat rate when conceding first is significantly lower. This difference reflects a truth: three centre-backs help coaches avoid being broken through early, but at the same time make their teams less creative in the midfield area. I remember a conversation with an assistant coach in the V.League in 2026. He said that domestic coaches are more afraid of public opinion than of their opponents. After a team loses 4-0 with a four-man defence, the wave of criticism on social media usually targets the coach's tactical scheme directly. But when a team loses 2-0 with three centre-backs, public opinion tends to blame individual errors. This is a remarkable paradox. Data from last season shows that teams using the three-centre-back formation have a 28% clean-sheet rate, slightly higher than the 25% of teams with four defenders. But the notable point is that the xG (expected goals) of the three-centre-back teams is significantly lower, averaging only 1.1 xG per match compared to 1.6 xG for teams playing 4-3-3. In other words, they are safer in defence but lose the attacking pressure on the opponent's goal. To understand more, I examined the tactics of Binh Duong FC in the 2026-2026 season. They switched from the familiar 4-2-3-1 to 3-5-2 after a 0-3 loss to CAHN. In the next four consecutive matches, they did not lose and conceded only two goals. But Binh Duong's shots on target dropped from 5.2 to 2.8 per match. They were no longer a ball-controlling team but became a counter-attacking team waiting for opponent errors. The return of three centre-backs is not a new invention. In world football history, the use of three centre-backs peaked about 15 years ago with the Italian national team and clubs like Juventus under Antonio Conte. But in the context of Southeast Asian football, domestic coaches switching to this formation has a deeper social cause. They are under pressure from a new generation of fans who watch matches on their phones and criticize directly on social media every time their team makes a mistake. Given that, sacrificing attacking power for safety is a rational decision to cope with expectations. But there is a significant problem: Southeast Asian national teams, including Vietnam, are starting to imitate this trend from the clubs. Vietnam under coach Kim Sang-sik at the 2026 AFF Cup used three centre-backs in important matches. And they succeeded by winning the title. But the Korean coach also realised that this formation makes the national team struggle when needing to attack against an opponent that deliberately drops deep. Look at how wing-backs in the 3-4-3 formation at the V.League play. They often have to perform two contradictory tasks: supporting attacks down the wing and dropping back to form a five-man defense. This requires enormous fitness. From the 70th minute onwards, most wing-backs of V.League teams noticeably decrease in output. This can be clearly seen in heat maps of player movement. A simple example: in the match between Thanh Hoa and Hai Phong in August, Thanh Hoa's left wing-back covered 11.2 km in the first half but only an additional 3.8 km in the second half. In contrast, in matches where the team uses a back four, the distance covered by wing-backs is usually more evenly distributed between the two halves. This imbalance explains why many teams switching to three centre-backs often lead in the first half and struggle to protect their advantage in the second half. The three-centre-back story is also linked to the story of a generation of Vietnamese players. The generation of Que Ngoc Hai, Do Duy Manh, Nguyen Thanh Chung – the best domestic centre-backs – they have the ability to play well in both four-man and three-man systems. But they are ageing. The 2026-2026 season is the last season for many of them at the peak of their form. When the younger generation hasn't been trained to play in a three-centre-back system, the dependence on these experienced centre-backs is becoming a potential risk. I remember an afternoon at the PVF Youth Football Training Center when a young coach told me: "Our students are trained to play in 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1 formations. When they go up to the first team and are suddenly asked to play three centre-backs, they are completely confused. They don't know their position in the first four weeks." This is a big gap between the youth training system and the first team's tactics. V.League clubs are spending a lot of money to buy foreign centre-backs experienced in playing three centre-backs, while domestic young talents are left behind. The return of the three-centre-back formation also affects how clubs conduct transfers. Last summer, 17 foreign centre-backs were recruited by V.League clubs with an average fee 35% higher than in the previous season. Clubs are willing to pay high salaries for a foreign centre-back from Brazil or South Korea to play in a three-man system, while creative domestic midfielders are being left out. This creates a paradox in the transfer market: a player's value depends on the team's tactical system, not on their actual ability. A player with vision like Nguyen Hoang Duc, if playing in a 3-4-3 formation, would be significantly limited. His role in a three-centre-back line-up is often pushed lower, requiring him to participate more in defence, or being squeezed between two central midfielders, shrinking his creative space. That is why this season, Hoang Duc has far fewer key passes than in the previous two seasons. He hasn't lost his talent; he has lost the system that suits him. According to data I collected from domestic football statistics websites, teams playing three centre-backs in the V.League this season have seen their direct attacking play decrease by 40% compared to when the same teams played four defenders. They rely more on set pieces: corners, long throw-ins, and direct free kicks. Up to 37% of this group's goals come from such situations. This is an important analysis showing that the three-centre-back formation not only affects how teams defend but also changes how they attack. Vietnamese football has had successful moments thanks to tactical flexibility. The 2026 AFF Cup with the 4-4-2 formation of coach Henrique Calisto, or the 2026 U23 Asian Championship with coach Park Hang-seo's 3-4-3. But in the case of Vietnam's U23 in 2026, the three-centre-back formation worked effectively because it was built on a generation of players with superior physical attributes and mobility. They had Doan Van Hau – a left-back of 1m85 height – who could attack and defend tirelessly. But by 2026, wing-backs with similar physical ability to Van Hau are very rare. When V.League teams still try to imitate Park Hang-seo's formula but lack the appropriate physical pieces, they fall into a tactical trap. They are not good enough to control possession in a three-centre-back system, nor fast enough to exploit spaces on transitions. As a result, they play cautious, ugly, and lifeless football. From a football practitioner's perspective, I believe that the return of the three-centre-back formation in the V.League is not a tactical revolution. It is a defensive act by coaches to protect their reputations. When you lose with a 4-3-3, you will be scrutinized by media and fans. But when you lose with a 3-5-2, you can blame set-pieces or referee decisions. The three-centre-back formation becomes a shield against criticism. I want to look at a different angle. Try comparing how the V.League uses three centre-backs with how the top European leagues have done it. In Europe, three centre-backs are often used to push the field high and press. For example, Atalanta under Gian Piero Gasperini uses three centre-backs playing very high, pressing aggressively and putting pressure on the opponent's defense in their half. But in the V.League, three centre-backs are often used to defend deep, creating a dense protective layer in front of the goal. This is clearly visible in the starting point of attacking moves. In the 2026-2026 V.League season, teams playing three centre-backs usually start their attacking moves only 28 meters from the opponent's goal, 12 meters lower than teams playing 4-3-3. This means they do not actively control possession in their own half but accept long-ball play, using aerial duels to create scoring chances. With the current attacking quality of many V.League teams, this style rarely brings high effectiveness. Another notable aspect is the mentality of players when going out with three centre-backs. I interviewed several players playing in the V.League (they asked to remain anonymous) and they shared that they feel more secure when playing with three centre-backs, but they also admitted that they don't fully understand their roles in this formation. "When playing with four defenders, I know exactly where I will be. With three centre-backs, I find myself having to decide more on my own, and sometimes I don't know if I'm doing my job correctly," a centre-back currently playing for a top team said. This uncertainty leads to many individual errors. Statistics show that in matches where both teams use three centre-backs, goals from individual errors account for up to 42%, significantly higher than in matches using modern formations. This proves that the lack of cohesion between the lines prevents players from supporting each other at the right moment. I still remember the words of a former Vietnamese star, now a commentator: "When I played, the coach told us to learn to read the game and adjust our positions. Now, coaches switch to three centre-backs just to make sure they don't face criticism." That statement may be controversial, but it touches on a truth that the data supports. It must be made clear that not all teams using three centre-backs fail. Ha Noi FC is still leading the standings with a 3-4-3 formation, showing that with the right core and the right tactics, this system can still work. But the problem is that too many teams are applying it as a defensive formula rather than an attacking philosophy. They confuse safety with effectiveness. In most V.League matches this season, we see teams playing three centre-backs but sitting very deep in defence, conceding possession to the opponent. They have no intention of imposing their style. They are simply waiting for the opponent's mistakes and trying not to make their own mistakes. But this is a plan easily broken when encountering opponents with good technique or set-piece situations. Strong opponents like Hai Phong or Steel Xanh Nam Dinh often exploit the spaces between the centre-backs and the wing-backs in a three-man system. When their wing-backs push high to attack, the space behind becomes easy prey for the opponent's wingers to exploit. The return of three centre-backs is not just about tactics. It also reflects a bigger issue in Vietnamese football: the shortage of coaches with bold attacking thinking. When a league has too many teams prioritizing defence, the quality of matches declines, and fans gradually lose interest. At some point, people will no longer want to spend money on tickets to watch teams park the bus in front of their own goal. I have followed Vietnamese football for over a decade, from the days sitting in the stands at Thong Nhat Stadium watching first-division matches, through major international matches like the AFF Cup or the Asian Cup. Through all that I have seen, I have learned that the sustainable development of a football nation does not come from teams defending brilliantly, but from them daring to attack, daring to expose spaces and accepting risk. Because only through risk can breakthroughs be created. Looking back at the history of world football, the greatest teams have one thing in common: they dare to play sacrificial football, regardless of the risk of losing. Barcelona under Pep Guardiola, Liverpool under Jurgen Klopp, and Manchester City under Guardiola later on – they are all attacking teams. They never sacrifice creativity for safety. They know the best way to defend is to control the ball and put pressure on the opponent. In contrast, V.League teams are gradually turning themselves into less attractive versions of Diego Simeone's Atletico Madrid. They accept a pragmatic style that may achieve results in a single match but does not create a long-term foundation for development. When a generation of coaches with a defensive mentality dominates, young players will never learn how to attack properly. In youth academies in Vietnam, coaches usually teach ball possession and short passing drills. But when those young players reach the first team and see the team using three centre-backs with a direct style, they must forget everything they have learned. This leads to a huge waste of talent. Many creative young players are eliminated simply because they don't fit the team's safe tactical scheme. A typical example is the case of a young player from the SLNA academy with excellent dribbling ability and sharp tactical vision. When he reached the first team, he often sat on the bench because the coach had no suitable position for him in the 3-5-2 formation. He preferred to play as a number 10 – an attacking midfielder – but in the three-centre-back system, that role almost doesn't exist. He was forced to play as a winger or not play at all. If he had been at a club playing 4-2-3-1, the story might have been completely different. This is the clearest evidence that team tactics directly affect the careers of individual players. Leagues like the V.League need to have a serious debate about their tactical direction. Do we want a league with many teams playing attacking, beautiful football, or a league where teams just try not to lose? This is a big question, not only for coaches but also for all Vietnamese football lovers. In this context, the emergence of foreign coaches with attacking mindsets is creating a breath of fresh air. Coaches like Alexandre Polking (who led Ho Chi Minh City FC) or Mano Polking in Southeast Asia tend to build ball-controlling teams. They are not afraid to keep creative attacking players, even accepting to sacrifice some defensive safety in exchange for attacking diversity. This has brought them success in various leagues across the region. However, only a few V.League teams currently dare to do the same. The pressure of match results and public opinion makes club managers more cautious. They would rather have a team that plays ugly but remains in a safe position in the standings than a team that plays beautifully but is at the bottom of the table. This short-sighted mindset is holding back the development of the entire league. I still remember a fascinating detail from the 2026 AFF Cup final, when Vietnam under coach Park Hang-seo faced Malaysia. Park is a coach known for preferring three centre-backs, but in that match, he used a fluid 3-4-3 formation, creating a creative midfield line with players like Nguyen Quang Hai. Park's system had flexibility, not a rigid tactic. He allowed his players to move freely and change positions. It was this flexibility that helped Vietnam control the game and win the title. In comparison, current V.League teams often make a fundamental mistake: they apply the three-centre-back formation as a rigid formula without adjusting to the opponent and match situation. They have no plan B or C when the initial plan fails. This lack of flexibility makes them vulnerable to opponents who know how to exploit their weaknesses. An important statistic to prove this: in the 2026-2026 season, the win rate of teams using three centre-backs is 41%, lower than teams using four defenders at 48%. This shows that using three centre-backs does not bring an advantage in terms of results. The opposite happens in European leagues, where teams playing three centre-backs like Atalanta or Inter Milan often have high win rates. This difference lies in how the tactic is applied. If V.League clubs could learn how Gasperini uses three centre-backs, they could create a tactical revolution. But to do that, they need centre-backs with good passing ability, central midfielders who can control space, and physically durable wing-backs. This requires a youth development system aligned with the first team's tactical philosophy. That is a long-term investment, and not every club is willing to do it. While waiting for systemic change, I will continue to document what happens on V.League pitches. I will observe how teams change formations during matches, how players adapt to new roles, and how fans respond to their team's style. Because for me, football is not just about statistics or match results. Football is a story about people, choices, and beliefs. And the story of the return of the three-centre-back formation in the V.League is still being written. Perhaps at some point, a young coach with progressive attacking thinking will emerge in the V.League, and he will prove that the 4-3-3 or even 4-2-4 formation can still succeed if built on a clear philosophy. Then, the return of the three-centre-back will only be seen as a brief episode in the history of Vietnamese football. But until then, we must accept the reality: V.League coaches are choosing safety, and that is suppressing the creativity of an entire generation of players. When the final whistle at Hang Day Stadium sounded, I closed my notebook and left the stands. The stadium lights were still bright, but I knew that Vietnamese football needs a different source of light – a light of innovation, bold ideas, and the belief that attacking is the best way to defend. The day will come when the doors of safety are broken down, and new ideas will pour in, igniting the flame of a generation of sacrificial and beautiful football. The fire never goes out in the stands; it just changes color into raised arms. And I believe that one day those arms will rise again in the joy of beautiful goals, not in the fear of conceding.